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Vouchers and Affordable Housing: The Limits
of Choice in the Political Economy of Place
Rigel C. Oliveri'
INTRODUCTION
America's housing segregation problem, and the direct role of govern-
ment and private actors in creating it, is well documented.2 What to do about
it is less clear. And even when consensus develops about particular strate-
gies, they can be difficult to implement because of significant headwinds
that impede change. These headwinds-including market forces, govern-
ment policies, and private prejudices-continue to stymie progress, and even
well-intentioned reform efforts can fail at best and lead to negative conse-
quences at worst.
This piece seeks not to provide answers, but rather to describe one such
set of reforms and headwinds and to propose some modest policy changes
that might lead to incremental progress. I discuss attempts to help poor mi-
nority families move to neighborhoods with less concentrated economic and
racial segregation in one particularly challenging place: the St. Louis metro-
politan area.
In St. Louis, as in many other major metropolitan areas, low-income
minority households tend to be clustered in high-poverty, racially segregated
neighborhoods. In the St. Louis area, these neighborhoods are located either
in St. Louis City or in North St. Louis County.' While some families may
prefer to live in these neighborhoods in order to be near social and family
networks, others may wish to move to areas with lower poverty rates, better
schools, and less crime. Research shows that adults and children benefit
when families are able to move to these so-called "higher-opportunity" 4
neighborhoods.5 In addition, the Fair Housing Act imposes a duty on the
' Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law; J.D., Stanford Law School,
1999; B.A., University of Virginia, 1994. The author was formerly a Trial Attorney for the
Housing & Civil Enforcement Section of the United States Department of Justice's Civil
Rights Division.
2 See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW (2017); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993).
3See MOLLY W. METZGER, CTR. FOR Soc. DEv., SECTION 8 IN THE ST. Louis REGION:
LOCAL OPPORTUNITIES To EXPAND HOUSING CHOICE 2 (2014).
4 "High opportunity" is defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") according to an "opportunity index," which accounts for, among other things,
school quality, poverty rates, labor market engagement, proximity to jobs, environmental
health, and transit costs. See Brent D. Mast, Measuring Neighborhood Opportunity With
AFFH Data, 17 CITYSCAPE: J. OF PoLY DEV. AND RES. 221, 223-24 (2015).
'BARBARA SARD & DOUGLAS RICE, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, CREATING
OPPORTUNITY FOR CHILDREN: How HOUSING LOCATION CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE (2014).
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federal government, federal agencies, and recipients of federal housing funds
to "affirmatively further" fair housing, which includes a mandate to foster
integrated living patterns. 6 Thus, policy-makers and advocates have strong
incentives to help poor Black families move out of segregated inner-city
neighborhoods and into racially and economically diverse ones.'
Yet patterns of economic and racial segregation remain stubbornly re-
sistant to change. There is a wide variety of reasons for this. In this article, I
look to one phenomenon that sociologists have termed "the political econ-
omy of place."8 This theoretical perspective recognizes that "places"-po-
litical units such as cities, suburbs, and exurbs-are the primary actors in
shaping socio-racial housing patterns. These places compete with one an-
other for resources and make zoning, land use, and development decisions
that segment their housing markets, a process that reinforces and compounds
existing economic and racial differences. Some of the "places" (municipali-
ties) that are the easiest to develop affordable housing in, and to help low-
This research is, however, somewhat inconclusive. For instance, some studies have found no-
ticeable improvements in mental and physical health and educational and economic outcomes.
See James E. Rosenbaum, Changing the Geography of Opportunity by Expanding Residential
Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program, 6 HousING POLY DEBATE 231, 240 (1995). But
while the Moving to Opportunity demonstration-a major experimental study launched in the
mid-1990s in five cities by HUD-found striking improvements in mental health for girls and
mental and physical health for mothers, it also found negative mental health outcomes for boys
and no economic gains for adults or educational gains for children. See DEP'T OF Hous. &
URBAN DEV., MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIR HOUSING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM: FINAL
IMPACTS EVALUATION 254-57 (2011).
6 Section 3608 of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") directs HUD to administer its programs
and activities "in a manner affirmatively to further the [FHA's] policies." 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608(d) (2018). The statute that created the Community Development Block Grant also re-
quires grant recipients to certify to HUD that their grant will be administered in conformity
with the FHA and that the recipient will use the funds in such a manner to "affirmatively
further fair housing." Id. at § 5304(b)(2). Although the term "affirmatively further" is not
defined, the legislative history of the FHA makes clear that Congress intended for the statute
both to eradicate housing discrimination and to foster integrated living patterns. For example,
Senator Mondale, the FHA's sponsor, stated that the law's purpose was to replace segregated
ghettos with "truly integrated and balanced living patterns." 114 Cong. Rec. 3422 (1968)
(statement of Sen. Mondale).
' We can contrast the mobility or deconcentration model with the "investment" or "en-
richment" model, which emphasizes improving communities for existing residents. While this
approach is also an important one, it contains its own difficulties: specifically, that improve-
ment without a thoughtful process is likely to lead to gentrification and displacement of ex-
isting residents and businesses. For a discussion of how some areas use data to predict and
mitigate gentrification and displacement, see Karen Chapple and Miriam Zuk, Forewarned:
The Use of Neighborhood Early Warning Systems for Gentrification and Displacement, 18
CITYscAPE 109, 109-30 (2016).
'See Daniel T. Lichter et al., Toward a New Macro-Segregation? Decomposing Segrega-
tion Within and Between Metropolitan Cities and Suburbs, 80 AM. Soc. REV. 843, 844 (2015).
Legal scholars sometimes refer to this focus as localism, in which discrete political subdivi-
sions act in their own self-interests, and contrast it with regionalism, in which political subdivi-
sions engage in some level of cooperative or shared governance. See, e.g., Richard Briffault,
The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1115
(1996); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 Geo. L.J. 1985 (2000); Clayton P. Gillette,
Regionalism and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 190 (2001).
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income families to move to, may be the least capable of providing the sort of
benefits and stability that such families are seeking. Other nearby places that
provide greater opportunity may be deliberately or practically inaccessible to
low-income families. In order to support stable, integrated neighborhoods, as
well as true housing choice, these places must instead cooperate with one
another in implementing regional planning goals-a difficult demand to
make in an under-resourced environment.
This article seeks to illuminate place competition theory by grounding it
in the real-world example of St. Louis. Section I discusses the difficulty of
deconcentrating poverty and promoting integration using the most common
methods for increasing affordable housing: Housing Choice Vouchers and
Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), specifically within the St. Louis
metropolitan area. Section II examines the problems created by place com-
petition in St. Louis, which has multiple political subdivisions and signifi-
cant economic inequality. Better regional planning, particularly in the area
of affordable housing development, is necessary to fix these problems now.
Section III looks to the future for areas like St. Louis, where the trend of the
urban poor shifting to the inner suburbs continues.
I. DECONCENTRATING POVERTY AND PROMOTING INTEGRATION
THROUGH .AFFORDABLE HOUSING
A. Providing Access to Affordable Housing: The Housing
Choice Voucher Program
Originally designed as an efficient way to subsidize housing for the
poor, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Housing
Choice Voucher program (Section 8, or HCV) is also considered a tool for
promoting economic and racial integration and for improving locational out-
comes for voucher holders.9 Indeed, because each voucher is used by an
individual in the private housing market, the program has the ability to dis-
perse poverty, rather than concentrating it as a public housing project would,
and to provide a maximum amount of choice for home-seekers.10
Section 8 vouchers represent a demand-side solution to affordable
housing. Under Section 8, low-income tenants pay 30% of their adjusted
gross income to the owner for rent." The government then pays the differ-
ence between this and the HUD-determined fair market rent (FMR), which
' J. Rosie Tighe et al., Source of Income Discrimination and Fair Housing Policy, 32 J.
PLANNING LiTrErluRE 3 (2017) (describing the dual goals of the voucher program).
0 Although HUD funds and regulates the Section 8 program, vouchers are administered at
the local level by Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) that coordinate federal, state, and local
housing programs. Tamica H. Daniel, Bringing Real Choice to the Housing Choice Voucher
Program: Addressing Voucher Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act, 98 Geo. L.J. 769,
772 (2010).
" Seventy-five percent of the vouchers issued by a PHA must go to families with incomes
that are at or below 30% of the area median income. Kirk McClure, Alex F. Schwartz, and
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can be described as the amount needed to rent a moderately priced unit in
the area. If the rent of a particular unit is higher than the FMR, the tenant can
elect to rent the unit nonetheless and pay the difference, so long as the tenant
does not pay more than 40% of her adjusted monthly income for rent in
total. Once a person receives a voucher, it is up to her to find a rental unit
within the allowable price range and to enter into a lease with a willing
landlord. Participants usually have a limited amount of time-around 60
days from receipt of the voucher-to enter into a lease before the voucher
expires.
While the voucher program provides much-needed housing assistance
to low-income families, it falls short in several key respects. As an initial
matter, the program is woefully underfunded: only 25% of people who are
poor enough to qualify for a voucher actually receive one.1 2 Thus, a voucher-
focused set of solutions to segregation and affordability misses the mark
with respect to three-quarters of the population involved. The next problem
is utilization. Despite demand outstripping supply and long waiting-lists for
vouchers, every year 10% of those fortunate enough to receive vouchers are
unable to find apartments in which they can use their vouchers before they
expire.1 3 Finally, the program often fails to change locational outcomes. That
is to say, voucher-holders tend to live in the same high-poverty, segregated
neighborhoods as they did before they received vouchers.1 4 Reformers have
sought to address the latter two problems-underutilization and poor loca-
tional outcomes-using a number of different methods.
1. Programmatic Changes
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a nonpartisan research and
policy institute, recommends a number of strategies that HUD can imple-
ment in order to increase voucher-holder access to higher opportunity neigh-
borhoods. These strategies include:
* Providing additional financial support for voucher-holders who wish
to make "opportunity moves,"
* Allowing additional search time for families seeking to move to low-
poverty neighborhoods,
* Simplifying voucher portability procedures throughout metro areas,
and
Lydia B. Taghavi, Housing Choice Voucher Location Patterns a Decade Later, 25 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 215, 215-33 (2015).
12 See Policy Basics: Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/policy-basics-federal-rental-assis-
tance, archived at https://perma.cc/S6M5-L76B.
" Rachel Bogardus Drew, Improving Housing Choice Voucher Utilization, ENTERPRISE
COMMUNrrY PARTNERS (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/blog/2018/09/
improving-housing-voucher-utilization, archived at https://perma.cc/G9A3-CT45.
14 See LANCE FREEMAN, DEPT OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE IMPACT OF SOURCE OF
INCOME LAWS ON VOUCHER UTILIZATION AND LOCATIONAL OUTCOMES 11 (2011); McClure,
Schwartz & Taghavi, supra note 11, at 225; Tighe et. al., supra note 9, at 4.
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* Creating incentives for housing authorities to work together to assist
voucher-holders in moving from one jurisdiction to another.'
To the extent that these measures reduce administrative barriers for op-
portunity moves, it stands to reason that they will have some positive effects,
although these measures alone would do little to address underutilization and
poor locational outcomes.
2. Expanding Protection Against Discrimination Based on Source
of Income
There is no question that a significant number of landlords refuse to
accept vouchers. HUD recently conducted a groundbreaking study in five
diverse, major metropolitan areas-Fort Worth, Los Angeles, Newark, Phila-
delphia, and Washington, D.C.-and found significant discrimination
against voucher-holders in each area.16
Discrimination against voucher-holders is difficult to combat using the
federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) as it is currently written. Economic status
and receipt of public assistance are not protected classes under the FHA.7
But voucher discrimination can mask discrimination that is really based on
characteristics that the FHA does protect: in particular, race, ethnicity, gen-
der, disability, and familial status. In order to establish disparate treatment or
discriminatory intent in such cases, the plaintiff would need to prove that the
prohibited basis for discrimination was the actual one and that the refusal to
accept vouchers was merely pretext. But this may be difficult. For example,
if the defendant adheres to a strict "no-voucher" policy (and many do),'" the
plaintiff will be hard-pressed to demonstrate that the landlord is really using
this policy as a cover for discrimination based on a protected characteristic
in a particular instance."
As an alternative, plaintiffs may challenge a no-voucher policy using a
disparate impact claim. The FHA prohibits practices that may appear neutral,
such as refusing to accept vouchers, but that result in "disparate impacts"
for a protected class.2 0 The Section 8 program disproportionally serves mem-
' SARD & RICE, supra note 5, at 9.
6 DEPT OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., A PILOT STUDY OF LANDLORD ACCEPTANCE OF Hous-
ING CHOICE VOUCHERS xi (2018) [hereinafter HUD Testing Study].
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination in housing based on
race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status, and disability).
II HUD estimates that the United States has 10 to 12 million total landlords and only a
fraction of them participate in the voucher program. HUD reports that between 2009 and 2016,
the number of landlords participating in the voucher program declined from 775,000 to
695,000. See Office of Policy Development and Research, Landlords: Critical Participants in
the Housing Choice Voucher Program, EvIDENCE MATTERS (Winter 2019).
19 See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 2019 WL 1529692 (5th
Cir. 2019); Karim-Panahi v. 4000 Massachusetts Apt., 302 F. Supp. 3d 330 (D.D.C. 2018).
20 The Supreme Court recently held that disparate impact claims are cognizable in Fair
Housing Act cases. Tex. Dept. of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
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bers of protected classes-women, families with children, racial and ethnic
minorities, and persons with disabilities. Thus, a landlord whose units would
otherwise qualify for the program based on their rental price but who refuses
to accept vouchers creates a disparate impact on those groups. This argument
has had mixed success in the courts. Some courts have allowed plaintiffs to
proceed under a disparate impact theory,2 1 but others, pointing to the volun-
tary nature of the program and the costs associated with it, have been
skeptical. 2 2
When a plaintiff can establish disparate impact, the burden then shifts
to the defendant to prove that the action had a legitimate business purpose.
While some landlords no doubt refuse to accept vouchers out of stereotypi-
cal concerns about the sort of tenants who participate in the program, others
may have legitimate problems with the program's bureaucracy. 23 For exam-
ple, in order to participate in Section 8, landlords must allow apartment in-
spections, an extra step that the landlord otherwise would not have to take to
rent the apartment. In addition, there may be delays in the leasing process or
in payment from the housing authorities. Government shut-downs, which
can cause payments to be suspended, are another reason a landlord might not
wish to participate. If a landlord invokes these concerns, it may be enough to
satisfy the legitimate business purpose defense.
Given the difficulty of enforcing anti-voucher discrimination under the
Fair Housing Act as written, some advocates have called for a more compre-
hensive and straightforward approach, namely, amending the FHA to in-
clude lawful source of income (SOI) as a protected characteristic. Although
legislation to this end has been introduced in Congress, most recently in the
bipartisan Fair Housing Improvement Act of 2018,24 it routinely fails. In the
absence of federal action, nine states and the District of Columbia have
made SOI a protected characteristic under their own statutes and at least 70
municipalities have done so by ordinance. 25
21 See Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp. 148, 154-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (allowing plaintiff to proceed on claim that landlord's refusal to accept Sec-
tion 8 vouchers created a racially disparate impact); Green v. Sunpointe Assocs. Ltd., No.
C96-1542C, 1997 WL 1526484, at *2-*7 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 1997) ("[I]f a plaintiff can
make out a prima facie case of disparate impact, a landlord may present his goal to terminate
participation in the Section 8 program as a business necessity. Because Congress had made
clear that participation in the program remains voluntary, substantial weight must be given to
such a goal.").
22 Graoch Assocs. #33 v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Human Relations Comm., 508
F.3d 366, 377-79 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding plaintiffs disparate-impact claim insufficient to
meet burden under FHA).
23 Armen H. Merjian, Attempted Nullification: The Administrative Burden Defense In
Source Of Income Discrimination Cases, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 211 (2015).
24 Fair Housing Improvement Act of 2018, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 15/
s3612, archived at https://perma.cc/P2X9-9ER7.
' Alison Bell, Barbara Sard & Becky Koepnick, Prohibiting Discrimination Against
Renters Using Housing Vouchers Improves Results, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES
(Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/prohibiting-discrimination-against-
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It is important to note that SOI protection does not always guarantee
protection for voucher-holders. Some courts and legislatures distinguish be-
tween monetary income and participation in the voucher program. Indeed,
four states (California, Delaware, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) have SOI laws
that either specifically exclude housing vouchers26 or have been interpreted
by court decisions not to cover vouchers. 27 Some of these state laws have
been found to preempt municipal efforts to pass their own voucher protec-
tions. 28 Where SOI protection exists only at the municipal level, sanctions
for violating the law are low and enforcement may be weak. As a result,
landlords may flout SOI mandates. For example, a recent study found that
landlords in St. Louis City, which recently passed an SOI/voucher law,
continued to engage in rampant discrimination against voucher holders, in-
cluding brazenly featuring "no Section 8" language in their housing
advertisements. 29
Despite landlord recalcitrance, SOI laws are an important step in the
right direction. HUD's testing project found significantly lower denial rates
in Newark (31%) and Washington, D.C. (15%), both of which have SOI
laws.3 0 Denial rates were highest in Fort Worth (78%) and Los Angeles
(76%), which do not have SOI laws.' Philadelphia's denial rate of 67% was
somewhat lower but still high.32 The researchers suggested this phenomenon
renters-using-housing-vouchers-improves-results#_ftnl 1, archived at https://perma.cc/4U7L-
PFRW.
26 Cal. FEHA Gov. Code 12955(o) (2018) ("It shall be unlawful ... [i]n instances where
there is a government rent subsidy, to use a financial or income standard in assessing eligibility
for the rental of housing that is not based on the portion of the rent to be paid by the tenant
.... For the purposes of this section, 'source of income' means lawful, verifiable income paid
directly to a tenant or paid to a representative of a tenant. For the purposes of this section, a
landlord is not considered a representative of a tenant.").
27 Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing
vouchers from other forms of income by noting that voucher money goes directly to the land-
lord instead of to the voucher holder, and finding that Wisconsin's SOI law therefore did not
protect voucher-holders).
28 Indeed, Texas passed a statute specifically making clear that it was preempting munici-
palities from enacting voucher protections: "Except as provided by this section, a municipality
or county may not adopt or enforce an ordinance or regulation that prohibits an owner, lessee,
sublessee, assignee, managing agent, or other person having the right to lease, sublease, or rent
a housing accommodation from refusing to lease or rent the housing accommodation to a
person because the person's lawful source of income to pay rent includes funding from a
federal housing assistance program." Tex. Local Gov't Code § 250.007 (2018). Austin's
voucher-protection ordinance was found invalid after thAt law's passage. City of Austin v.
Paxton, 325 F. Supp. 3d 749, 759 (W.D. Tex. 2018). But see City and County of San Francisco
v. Post, 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 235, 248 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
29 METo. ST. Louis EQUAL Hous. OPPORTUNITY CouNCiL, LOCKED OuT/LOcKED IN:
SECTION 8 DIsCRIMINATION IN ST. Louis Crry 2 (2019). The report goes on to note that the
sanction for violating the City's ordinance against SOI discrimination is just a $500 fine, and
that the City's enforcement mechanism has financial limitations of its own. Id. at 5.
30 HUD Testing Study, supra note 16, at 30. An earlier HUD analysis found that voucher
utilization rates improved between 4% and 11% in areas with SOI protections. See FREEMAN,
supra note 14, at 11.
1' HUD Testing Study, supra note 16, at 30.
32 Id.
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might be due in part to the fact that while Philadelphia has a SOI, neighbor-
ing Buck's County, which was also part of the study, does not.3 3
But while SOI laws may improve voucher utilization, the locational
outcomes for voucher-holders in areas with such laws hardly change. Put
another way, voucher-holders are almost as likely to end up in a high-pov-
erty segregated neighborhood in jurisdictions with SOI laws as without. 4
This is particularly true for voucher-holders who are Black.3 5 One reason for
this is the persistent discrimination against voucher holders in wealthier
neighborhoods. HUD's testing study found that voucher denial rates were 11
to 27 percentage points higher in low-poverty census tracts compared with
high-poverty tracts in the same metropolitan areas.3 6 Even more significant
is the lack of affordable housing itself in wealthier neighborhoods, where
many units will not be eligible for vouchers because their rents are too high
when compared against the FMR for the entire metropolitan area.3 7 A SOI
law will not make much of a difference in improving neighborhood choice if
vouchers can be used in only a few neighborhoods where the rents are low
enough for vouchers.
The difference in rents is particularly stark in the western and southern
parts of the St. Louis metropolitan area, which contains some of the wealthi-
est municipalities in the nation. 38 While the FMR for St. Louis County as a
whole is $924 for a two-bedroom apartment, in affluent south-county cities
the median rental prices can be much more. For example, in Ladue, the aver-
age rent is $1,874; in Frontenac, it is $1,669, and in Town & Country, it is
$1,208.39 Average rents are much lower in north St. Louis County cities like
33 Id.
34 A HUD analysis of different jurisdictions found that the poverty rate was one percent-
age point lower in the census tracts of voucher recipients living in areas with S01 laws-a
small, but statistically significant improvement. The areas remained just as segregated, how-
ever, and the ratio of voucher holders just as high, whether there was a SOI in place or not.
FREEMAN, supra note 14, at 17.
3 Id. at 22 (noting that SOI laws made no meaningful difference in outcomes for Black
voucher holders, both in terms of neighborhood racial diversity or poverty deconcentration).
3 6 HUD Testing Study, supra note 16, at 32.
37 A metropolitan area is large and contains many neighborhoods. Thus, a fair market
average rent will by definition be much less likely to include units in the more expensive
neighborhoods. See HUD Testing Study, supra note 16, at 36 (finding large numbers of rental
housing priced out of reach for voucher holders). But see ALICIA MAZZARA & BRIAN KNuD-
SEN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, WHERE FAmIMEs WrTH CHILDREN USE HOUSING
VOUCHERs: A ComPARATIvE LOOK AT THE 50 LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS (2019) (finding
that there were affordable units in high opportunity neighborhoods in all 50 of the largest
metropolitan areas that were not being used by voucher-holders).
3 The South St. Louis County cities of Frontenac, Ladue, and Town & Country are three
of the richest suburbs in America. Andy Kiersz, Mike Nudelman & Melia Robinson, The 25
Wealthiest Suburbs in America, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/
richest-suburbs-in-america-2014-10, archived at https://perma.cc/WJ65-7BAL.
3 Ladue Rental Market Trends, RENTCAFE, https://www.rentcafe.com/average-rent-mar-
ket-trends/us/mo/st-louis-county/ladue, archived at https://perma.cc/CGM4-ZYXY; Fronteac
Rental Market Trends, RENTCAFE, https://www.rentcafe.com/average-rent-market-trends/us/
mo/st-louis-county/frontenac/, archived at https://perma.cc/R855-7P68; Town & Country
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Ferguson ($635), Florissant ($751), and Jennings ($616).40 This imbalance
means fewer eligible units in wealthier cities, which translates into a higher
concentration of voucher usage in poorer cities. Currently there are nearly 20
times as many Section 8 renters in the predominantly Black North St. Louis
County than in predominantly white South St. Louis County.41
B. Expanding the Stock of Affordable Housing: The LIHTC Program
One of the most successful supply-side mechanisms to increase the
amount of affordable housing is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC). Congress created the LIHTC program as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 in order to encourage private investors to support the develop-
ment of affordable rental housing.42 The funding is keyed to the number of
units available to low-income renters. States receive a fixed dollar amount of
tax credits that they award to developers through a state-created Qualified
Allocation Plan (QAP), which includes particular selection criteria and pref-
erences in addition to federal program guidelines. The tax credits have been
responsible for producing over 3 million housing units between 1987 and
2016.43
LIHTC can provide a critical source of investment capital for rehabili-
tating older housing and developing new affordable housing stock. However,
the program guidelines have led to the criticism that the LIHTC program
perpetuates economic and racial segregation by concentrating affordable
housing in already-poor, often racially-segregated neighborhoods.44 Specifi-
cally, the LITHC funding formula gives preferences for projects located in a
census tract where 50% of households have incomes below 60% of the Area
Median Gross Income or where the poverty rate is 25% or more. 45 For exam-
ple, in the St. Louis area, LIHTC properties are overwhelmingly concen-
Rental Market Trends, RENTCME, https://www.rentcafe.com/average-rent-market-trends/us/
mo/st-louis-county/town-and-country, archived at https://perma.cc/F3TV-WKLJ.
' Ferguson Rental Market Trends, RENTCAFE, https://www.rentcafe.com/average-rent-
market-trends/us/mo/st-louis-county/ferguson, archived at https://perma.cc/S9QX-EJML;
Florissant Rental Market Prices, RENTCAFE, https://www.rentcafe.com/average-rent-market-
trends/us/mo/st-louis-county/florissant, archived at https://perma.cc/J4RB-X6PC; Jennings
Rental Market Trends, RENTCAFE, https://www.rentcafe.com/average-rent-market-trends/us/
mo/st-louis-county/jennings/, archived at https://perma.cc/9JW4-DT5B.
41 John Eligon, An Indelible Black-and-White Line, N.Y. TIMAES, Aug. 9, 2015, at Al.
4 2
MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22389, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
Low-INcoME HOUSING TAX CREDIrr 1 (2018).
4 3 Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., https://www.hud
user.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html, archived at https://perma.cc/87E8-3545.
4 See, e.g., Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing
Tax Credit Program and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MiAMi L. REv. 1011 (1998); Myron
Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1747 (2005).
4 Qualified Census Tracts and Difficult Development Areas, DEPT OF Hous. AND URBAN
DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/qct.html, archived at https://perma.cc/6TY7-
4EXL.
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trated in St. Louis City and near the northern border of the County/City
line.4 6
There are a number of changes state governments can make to their
QAPs in order to increase the number of LIHTC developments placed in
low-poverty, diverse neighborhoods, and to give poor households and people
of color greater access to developments in low-poverty, diverse areas. For
example,
[States] can set aside a fixed minimum share of credits to be allo-
cated to those developments [in high opportunity areas], give
them more points in the scoring system used to select LIHTC de-
velopments, or allow those developments to receive supplemental
credits referred to as a "basis boost." These incentives can be
targeted on projects that meet a range of opportunity criteria, in-
cluding low poverty rates, proximity to high-performing schools,
or access to jobs.47
In addition, states could take measures to decrease the possibility of
resistance from local governments for LIHTC projects. Historically, many
states have required approval from local governments for LIHTC allocations
or have given preference to projects that have such approval. Such policies
effectively give local governments the power to veto LIHTC projects by
disapproving them or by refusing to provide a contribution to support them.4
To the extent that wealthier cities are better able to resist efforts at creating
affordable housing, eliminating the requirement for city approval could help
place LIHTC properties in less economically and racially segregated areas.
H1. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE AND THE NEED FOR
COORDINATED REGIONAL AND STATE RESPONSES
To AFFORDABLE HOUSING
One common element in all of the above solutions is the need for coor-
dinated, comprehensive reform. SOI protections help with voucher utiliza-
tion, but they only exist in some areas and are not always enforced
effectively. Moreover, they will not provide true neighborhood choice if
they can only be used in a handful of affordable neighborhoods. LIHTCs can
help create affordable housing, but they will not offer true housing choice if
they are clustered only in low-income, segregated areas.
4 6 A recent study found that out of 389 total LIHTC properties in the St. Louis area (not
including any parts of Ilinois), 334 were either located in the City or in the northwestern part
of St. Louis County. This accounted for 78% of the total LIHTC units in the area. See Ross
Clarke and Nina Parikh, Low Income Housing Tax Credit Properties in St. Louis City and St.
Louis County (map on file with author).
4 7 WILL FISCHER, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIEs, Low-INcoME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT COULD Do MORE To EXPAND OPPORTUNITY FOR POOR FAMLIES 5-6 (2018).
48 Id.
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The example of North St. Louis County, including the now infamous
city of Ferguson, is illustrative of the pitfalls of the lack of a coordinated
approach to affordable housing. 49 Ferguson and other suburbs like it origi-
nally came to prominence in the late 1940s and early 1950s as the result of
white flight from St. Louis City. For decades, Ferguson's Black population
was virtually zero, although it bordered the small, majority Black city of
Kinloch. In 1970, Ferguson was 99% white.51
After 1968, with the passage of the Fair Housing Act, Black families
slowly began to move into Ferguson and other formerly all-white municipal-
ities in North St. Louis County. 52 As they did so, whites moved further west
and south. In 1980, as the pace of Black mobility increased, the town was
85% white and 14% Black.53 Ferguson's City Council approved the construc-
tion of low- and mixed-income housing apartments in a newly-annexed
neighborhood on the East Side. Some of the units were refurbished in the
mid-1980s by investment groups using LIHTCs. Black families who were
displaced from Kinloch by the expansion of the Lambert St. Louis Airport,
or those seeking to leave St. Louis City, were able to move to a suburb that
was neither extremely poor nor heavily segregated.5 4 In 1990, Ferguson was
approximately 75% white and 25% Black. 5
Wealthier, whiter municipalities resisted affordability by engaging in
exclusionary zoning practices such as requiring single family homes on large
lots that would be out of the price range for many Black families. 6 These
places used zoning and land-use laws to prevent the construction of public
housing, low-income housing, and even multi-family housing (i.e., apart-
ment buildings) that would be likely to attract Black occupants.5 7 They could
49 Jesse Bogan, Denise Hollinshed & Stephen Deere, Why Did the Michael Brown Shoot-
ing Happen Here?, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 17, 2014), https://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/metro/why-did-the-michael-brown-shooting-happen-here/article678334ce-500a-
5689-8658-f548207cf253.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TK8H-TK52.
" COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. Louis AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN CITY
70 (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008).
" Paulina Firozi, 5 Things to Know About Ferguson, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2014), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/08/14/ferguson-police-department-details/
14064451/, archived at https://perma.cc/YXS9-J2BC.
52 GORDON, supra note 50, at 147-49.
5 3 Editorial, The Death of Michael Brown, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 12, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/opinion/racial-history-behind-the-ferguson-protests.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/7R8D-JSHU.
' Jeffrey Smith, You Can't Understand Ferguson Without First Understanding These
Three Things, NEw REPUBLIC (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com///ferguson-mis-
souris-complicated-history-poverty-and-racial-tension, archived at https://perma.cclR3XS-
WELH.
" 1990 Census of Population, General Population Characteristics: Missouri, BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS 37, https://web.archive.org/web/20030318231514/http://www.census.gov/prod/
cenl990/cpl/cp- 1-27.pdf.
See GORDON, supra note 50, at 70.
* One particularly stark example of this occurred in Black Jack, MO, which refused to
allow the construction of multifamily housing in what was widely viewed as an effort to pre-
vent Black people from moving there from St. Louis City. See United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
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resist LIHTC properties, or make such development so expensive as to be
financially unfeasible.
Meanwhile, cities like Ferguson continued to receive more and more
LIHTCs. Another project was awarded in 2005 in order to refurbish a 438-
unit complex called Northwinds.5 8 Not long after this, Ferguson officials
were approached by investors and state housing officials with another
LIHTC project for a 336-unit property called Park Ridge. 9 City officials,
concerned about the concentrated number of low-income apartments on its
east side, were resistant to the project (although they did not write formal
opposition letters). The City's Mayor at the time was quoted as saying, "The
state just forced it on us.. . . I even said, 'Why don't you put it in Wildwood
[in West County]? Why don't you put it in Chesterfield [in South
County] ?" According to news reports, he was told that the project wouldn't
be profitable for investors if it were located in more affluent cities.'
By 2010, Ferguson was 71% Black. All of its neighborhoods except
one had a poverty rate that exceeded 20%. It is now part of a census tract
that contains the largest number of Section 8 vouchers in the St. Louis met-
ropolitan area. The vast majority of LIHTC properties in the St. Louis area
are clustered in the City and in North St. Louis County.
Housing policy scholars argue that spatial-mobility programs should re-
sult in a net social gain for all involved, including the poor, the taxpayers,
and the neighborhoods receiving the poor households.62 Programs designed
to relocate the poor must be viewed "in terms of the benefits to the house-
holds receiving the assistance as well as the costs that may be imposed upon
the neighborhoods absorbing the assisted households."6 3 These costs include
reduced values for properties near clusters of voucher-holders in neighbor-
hoods that are already experiencing declines in value." As one group of
scholars notes:
For net social gains to be realized, the gains from relocating the
poor away from neighborhoods with high levels of poverty must
be greater than the losses experienced by the receiving neighbor-
hoods. Specifically, the goal of poverty deconcentration is served
" Jesse Bogan & Walter Moskop, As Low-Income Housing Boomed, Ferguson Pushed
Back, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 19, 2014), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/
as-low-income-housing-boomed-ferguson-pushed-back/articlefcb97a3c-8bb7-54a5-9565-255




62 George C. Galaster, An Economic Efficiency Analysis of Deconcentrating Poverty
Populations, 11 J. oF HOUSING ECoN. 303 (2002); George C. Galaster, Investigating
Behavioural Impacts of Poor Neighbourhoods: Towards New Data and Analytic Strategies, 18
HOUSING STUDIES 893 (2003).
63 Galaster, supra note 62, at 909-11.
* George C. Galaster, Peter Tatian & Robin Smith, The Impact of Neighbors Who Use
Section 8 Certificates on Property Values, 10 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 879 (1999).
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by helping poor households move to tracts where poverty is low
(less than 10%) rather than moderate or high, and to do so without
raising the level of poverty such that a tract moves from being a
low-poverty tract to a higher category.6 5
Thus, in order to minimize losses for the receiving neighborhoods, moder-
ate-poverty neighborhoods, like Ferguson was in the 1990s, must not be
treated as "destination neighborhoods" expected to absorb additional poor
households."
As the political economy of place theory recognizes, "ongoing ecologi-
cal processes in metropolitan areas have created 'the potential for a new
geopolitical order capable of compounding the benefits and liabilities of
class by superimposing administrative segmentation on economic segrega-
tion.' 67 If a municipality's property. values and tax base are falling, it may
well be vulnerable to external forces from other political units. More affluent
places will compete in order to draw away high value development and
wealthier residents. A poorer city's desire to attract redevelopment capital
may create a snowball effect, which makes it an attractive site for more and
more low-income housing, perhaps pressed by state authorities who are ea-
ger to satisfy outside investors. Both of these trends increase racial, as well
as economic, segregation.
We can expect this type of competition to be more extreme in larger
and more economically diverse areas that have multiple political units.68 The
St. Louis metropolitan area is an example. It contains independent St. Louis
City as well as St. Louis County, which is made up of 91 different munici-
palities. Thus, what might look to a casual observer like a big city sur-
rounded by suburbs and exurbs is actually a patchwork of nearly 100
political subdivisions, some just a few miles square, each with its own mu-
nicipal services, local taxation authority, and zoning and development plans.
This environment creates a collective action problem. Rather than work to-
gether with regional allies, wealthier cities have the incentive to continue
with exclusionary land-use practices, including low-density zoning and re-
65 McClure et al., supra note 14, at 225.
* Id. This appears to be exactly what happens throughout the nation. About 10% of all
voucher households live in high-poverty neighborhoods, tracts with poverty greater than 40%.
While 10% is a small percentage, it is increasing. In addition, about 70% of voucher house-
holds live in tracts with moderate (10-40%) poverty. Thus, 80% of voucher households live in
neighborhoods with high or moderate poverty. Id. at 225-26.
67 Lichter et al., supra note 8, at 847-48 (internal citation omitted).
68 See Lichter et al., supra note 8, at 849 ("Viewed from a political economy of place
perspective, the cities and suburban communities within large and economically diverse metro-
politan regions face substantially more competition for affluent residents and commercial ac-
tivity than do their counterparts in smaller, more homogenous, emerging metropolitan regions.
The substantive implication is clear: metropolitan segregation will consist of larger shares of
macro-segregation in older, heavily populated, industrial metropolitan areas. That is, place-to-
place differentiation will be greater in these metropolitan areas, including greater differentia-
tion by race and ethnicity (i.e., macro-segregation).").
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strictions on rentals, multifamily buildings, and LIHTC properties.6 9 These
patterns are then reinforced by all the usual suspects: white flight, racial
discrimination, lending discrimination, and racial steering practices.
One way to open up additional opportunities in dispersed markets that
avoids creating large clusters of low-income housing is to expand the
purchase power of the voucher. HUD has experimented with so-called
"small-area FMRs," which calculate the FMR at the zip-code level rather
than the entire metropolitan area.70 This wouJd allow a family to use a
voucher in a more affluent neighborhood, because it would peg the allowa-
ble amount of subsidized rent to a more localized area, rather than the re-
gional average.
But again, there are qualifiers. For this to be successful, SOI protections
must cover every municipality in the region, to counter the resistance to
vouchers shown by higher-income neighborhoods. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach would also limit the number of vouchers a Public Housing Authority
(PHA) could issue. PHAs are allocated a set funding amount for their
voucher programs, and the program is already so underfunded that only a
quarter of households who are poor enough to qualify for vouchers actually
receive them. Spending more on costlier vouchers in more expensive neigh-
borhoods would leave fewer resources for everyone else. Thus, PHAs will
have to make a difficult decision: meet as much of the existing need as
possible, or help a smaller number of families relocate to more affluent ar-
eas. In St. Louis, Housing Authority officials were faced with this choice in
2013 when Congress cut HUD funding as part of the budget sequestration.7 1
The Housing Authority actually chose to decrease the voucher payment stan-
69 Daniel T. Lichter, Domenico Parisi, Steven Michael Grice & Michael Taquino, Munici-
pal Underbounding: Annexation and Racial Exclusion in Small Southern Towns, 72 RURAL
Soc. 47 (2007) ("Annexation-or the lack of annexation-can be a political tool used by
municipal leaders to exclude disadvantaged or low-income populations, including minorities,
from voting in local elections and from receiving access to public utilities and other commu-
nity services.").
o NYU FURMAN CTR., How Do SMALL AREA FMRs AFFECT THE LOCATION AND NuM-
BER OF UNITS AFFORDABLE TO VOUCHER HOLDERS? 2-3 (2018) ("With a single payment stan-
dard operating across a metropolitan area, the homes affordable to voucher holders tend to be
concentrated in jurisdictions and neighborhoods with relatively low rents, which are often
areas with high poverty rates and limited opportunities for advancement."). In fact, HUD has
recently mandated the use of Small-Area FMRs in 24 select metropolitan areas. St. Louis was
not one of them. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System; Using Small Area
Fair Market Rents in the Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead of the Current 50th Percen-
tile FMRs, 81 Fed. Reg. 80567, 80567-80587 (Nov. 16, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt.
888, 982-83, 985).
71 The sequester refers to the automatic cuts to federal government spending in particular
areas as part of an austerity fiscal policy under the Budget Control Act of 2011. The reductions
in spending authority were approximately $85.4 billion (versus $42 billion in actual cash out-
lays) during fiscal year 2013, with similar cuts for years 2014 until 2021. See Dylan Matthews,
The Sequester: Absolutely Everything You Could Possibly Need to Know, in One FAQ, THE
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dard, which kept virtually all of its existing clients in the program but meant
that fewer families were able to move out of high-poverty, racially segre-
gated areas.7 2
111. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
Some urban centers gentrify and displace residents. Others languish,
prompting residents to leave if they can. As a result, with respect to racial
and economic differences, the city-suburb barrier has become less important
than the differences between suburbs. 73 In recent decades, the pattern has
been for many of the poor Blacks who leave cities to move to inner ring
suburbs, like Ferguson.74 Suburban whites who are so inclined then flee to
more expensive suburbs, unincorporated housing developments, and gated
communities.75 Inner-ring suburbs used to be the places where whites segre-
gated themselves away from inner-city Blacks; now, inner-ring suburbs may
be one of the few alternatives to the urban core for low-income Black
families.
While there has been some movement of poor, minority households out
of center cities, to some extent this has just moved the color line and re-
concentrated poverty in the suburbs. "[T]he mere fact of a reduction in the
incidence of high-poverty urban neighborhoods during the 1990s cannot au-
tomatically be associated with improved well-being for our metropolitan so-
cieties overall."76 In short, what may look in a snapshot like a diverse
neighborhood may well instead be an area that is rapidly resegregating. As
commentators have noted, "integrated communities have a hard time staying
integrated for extended periods," and many communities that were once in-
tegrated have now re-segregated and are largely non-white. 77 And what ini-
tially might seem like an opportunity move out of the city may ultimately
provide little change at all, especially as some suburbs begin to deteriorate.78
Which brings us back to vouchers and the question of how to provide
greater choice to the families who use them. SOI protections are an impor-
72 See Caitlin Lee & Clark Randall, Surviving the Waiting Game for Housing Aid, CrrY-
LAB (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/03/how-section-8-vouchers-work-
in-st-louis/554927/, archived at https://perma.cc/Z7MR-8J9F.
7 See Lichter et al., supra note 8, at 845-46.
7 4 See MYRON ORFIELD & THOMAS LUCE, INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, AMERICA'S
RACIALLY DIVERSE SUBURBs: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 2 (2012); Lichter et al., supra
note 8, at 845-46.
" See Daniel J. McGraw, The Complications of Our Deteriorating Inner-Ring Suburbs,
BELT MAGAZINE (Jan. 5, 2015); Lichter et al., supra note 8, at 845-46.
76 George C. Galster, Consequences From the Redistribution of Urban Poverty During the
1990: A Cautionary Tale, 19 EcON. DEV. Q. 119, 123 (2005).
" ORFIELD & LUCE, supra note 74, at 2.
7 McGraw, supra note 75 (noting that such suburbs typically lack the institutional and
social infrastructure to deal with the changing demographics and tax base that a poorer demo-
graphic brings). Moreover, the housing stock itself presents a problem. Because many of the
houses were built at once (during the post-war housing boom of the 1950s), they are deteriorat-
ing all at once, with little new housing being built to replace them. Id.
8092019]
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 54
tant first step in breaking up segregated patterns and providing true housing
choice for low-income people, but only if every municipality in the region
(or better yet, at the state level) undertakes these protections. Even then, SOI
protections will only be useful if there are plenty of affordable units in a
variety of neighborhoods. Using small-area FMRs and subsidizing "opportu-
nity moves" would help, but these measures might not be a realistic option
at a time when rising rents and resource limitations outstrip HUD's ability to
meet the needs of a vast majority of the eligible population. Again, it bears
repeating that voucher-based solutions only affect a quarter of the low-in-
come population.
A state-level planning and investment focus would be ideal, but the
nature of state politics makes this unlikely (as the St. Louis experience dem-
onstrates). 79 The next best step would be a regionalist approach among the
municipalities, in which each agrees to support its fair share of affordable
housing in lower-poverty areas, along with increased investment in inner-
ring suburbs. 0 Of course, this approach requires a level of cooperation that
may prove impossible. Professors Myron Orfield and Thomas Luce observe
that:
Existing membership organizations for municipalities, such as the
League of Cities, involve all types of cities and suburbs, rich and
poor, white and non-white. As voluntary membership organiza-
tions, they risk losing membership who disagree with their actions.
Thus, they are consensus- and status-quo-oriented and may be un-
likely to take any strong position on the issues necessary for subur-
ban stability.'
With this reality in mind, there are a number of strategies that diversify-
ing suburbs can take to adapt to these demographic changes, such as coordi-
nating social services, addressing transportation needs, and diversifying the
housing stock.8 2 Orfield and Luce suggest:
[T]he diverse suburbs must form their own organizations, support
them with dues, and seek government and private grants to fund
their reform efforts. Once created, these organizations should use
their political power, in every way they can, at the state and fed-
eral levels to ensure that current laws are enforced or changed to
support their stability and redevelopment.83
" See id.
s0 See id.
81 ORFIELD & LUCE, supra note 74, at 42.
82 See Pete Saunders, Inner Ring Suburbs Could Use Some Attention, FORBES (Sep. 28,
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petesaundersl/2016/09/28/inner-ring-suburbs-could-use-
some-attention/#15fldc433b50, archived at https://perma.cc/5E64-CW4F.
83 ORFIELD & LUCE, supra note 74, at 29.
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Thus, with or without state support, these places-cities and suburban mu-
nicipalities-must act together and coordinate with the Housing Authorities
whose jurisdictions may cross multiple political subdivisions.
CONCLUSION
The problems of concentrated poverty and racial segregation are so
complex, and have been so long in the making, that no one strategy is
enough to eliminate them. Even obvious solutions like SOI laws and
voucher-portability are unlikely to have much of an effect without multiple
coordinated interventions on a regional scale. Commentators note that,
"[s]table integration is possible, but it does not happen by accident. It is the
product of clear race-conscious strategies, hard work, and political collabo-
ration among local governments.""
This complexity is why the political economy of place matters. Some of
the most important mechanisms for change are vested within "places" that
tend to compete, rather than cooperate, with one another. As a result, politi-
cal subdivisions are both perpetrators and victims of patterns of racial subor-
dination and retrenchment. The experience of Section 8 voucher-holders in
the St. Louis area provides a powerful, if dispiriting, example. Recognizing
this, issue advocates must keep a macro-level perspective, even though their
work often requires a community-level focus. Cooperation is the only way to
realize true choice when it comes to low-income housing.
4 Id. at 2.
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